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The Fallacy of Truth. Sketches of a hermeneutic path focused on emptiness.

La falacia de la Verdad. Esbozos de un camino hermenéutico centrado en la vacuidad.

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ABSTRACT

This article offers a strategy of human liberation centering itself on an open attitude before nothingness, its recognition, and valuation for personal life. The text presents an argument against the attitude of searching for the Truth, understanding it as the absolute certainty. It starts off from the idea that man must relativize all processes of interpretation, this is to say, all hermeneutic exercises; with this, it is warned, it will be possible to liberate oneself from the exclusively linguistic search and from the linear or univocal learning. From this will be derived the contemplation of the option of being concerned for oneself, and of finding audible traces in silence which invite towards the comprehension of a nihilistic logic that is liberating from enslaving structures.

Keywords: Truth. Hermeneutic. Vacuity. Nothingness. Liberation.

RESUMEN

El presente artículo ofrece una estrategia de liberación humana centrándose en una actitud abierta ante la nada, su reconocimiento y valoración para la vida personal. El texto representa una argumentación contra la actitud de búsqueda de la Verdad, entendida ésta como la certeza absoluta. Se parte de la idea de que el hombre debe relativizar todo proceso de

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interpretación, es decir, todo ejercicio hermenéutico; con esto, se advierte, será posible liberarse de la búsqueda exclusivamente lingüística y del aprendizaje lineal o unívoco. De esto se derivará contemplar la opción de inquietarse por uno mismo, y de encontrar rasgos audibles en el silencio que inviten a la comprensión de una lógica nihilista liberadora de estructuras esclavizadoras.

Palabras Clave: Verdad. Hermenéutica. Vacuidad. Nada. Liberación

Introduction

The ontological conception of life, in its relationship or indifference to nothingness, has clear implications in the realm of personal progress, the improvement of the conditions of one's own existence or the achievement of the congruence of the contemporary human individual.

Every conception of what is best for humans has an anthropological reference with which it always has a relationship of dependence. Similarly, to a deeper degree, every anthropological reference is directly involved in the conception of being, a central issue in traditional Western metaphysics to this day. If we are to refer to a concept of being in constant dialectics with nothingness, it will be understandable to expect a structural modification in the anthropological conception and, therefore, in the modification of the conception of personal progress or what is best for the individual.

In this way, henceforth reference will be made to an alternative conception on the way to the improvement of the individual when he manages to admit a point of view focused on emptiness. *Nothingness,* as a specific noun, should not be understood as something associated with fiction, but as an inverse constitutive of the existing.

In this text an alternative conception of human progress is proposed, understood from the awareness of nothingness as a proactive configuration before the world. They also refer to some of the common paradigms focused on being and confront them with a new way of understanding them.

A Null Truth

The assumption that man can know the Truth is a fallacy that we must banish once and for all from our gullical minds. Contemporary man must assume that Truth is only a symbolic referent that serves to allude to that which is not attainable through distorting subjectivity. Moreover, it is not only that the distortion makes it difficult for us to contact the Truth, but that this, in which we have placed all our hopes of search, is simply not real, univocal or absolute. In this perspective, Truth, understood as something that is, is beyond our reach, just like everything that does not exist.

Thus, the only way truth can be is by not being, so that it remains a human aspiration, despite the impossibility of accessing it. Now, if truth is not being, in the manner of a chimera, it is simply part of what it is not. In this sense, nothingness is above the Truth since all our searches suppose it, at least in the sense that even to seek the Truth we need not to have it, so that nothingness makes it possible. The encounter with nothingness should not be sought, it is happening right now at the precise moment that it is, without us realizing it. To assume that nothingness is unknowable implies that we recognize the failure of every search. The passion for finding answers will always have to be satisfied with partial results and with the lightness of any explanation, depending on its inalienable link with nothingness. The unknowable nothingness contains the world, to the point that every existing entity is inserted into it. Thus, any explanation of our mind is nothing more than a derivation of the fact of palpating and evidencing our own limits.

Our constant search for answers distracts us from the central finding: that these are partial. Search is the first obstacle to finding the answers, as Watzlawick mentions:

> Is it true that the true meaning is revealed only when we do not seek it, when, instead of searching, we have learned to abandon the search? This is an inconceivable idea for the vast majority of men. Indeed, we always think that the great must be achieved somewhere, outside. It does not enter our minds that search is precisely the reason why we cannot find (1995, p. 48).

The liberation concerned is that concerning the Truth, not in the sense of liberating the Truth as if it were locked up and imprisoned, but of the obsession with having absolute control of knowledge from the full Truth. The human has become a slave to his own search for the Truth. But it is from that idea of Truth from which the human must free himself to meet the nothingness that is the source of everything. It is not a stunner nothingness, but a nothing that fertilizes and that allows everything that is to be.

That is why it is up to us to relativize all hermeneutics and assume that no learning is sufficiently valid. Even science has human and contextual parameters to focus on, such as the use of any language that, strictly speaking, is distorting. Next, we will delve into the aspects just mentioned.

Nothingness and the relativization of all hermeneutics

Hermeneutics has been understood as the human process in which what has been captured is interpreted. However, that interpretation is not entirely comprehensive because it is made from a particular perspective. There is no hermeneutic that unifies all the possibilities of interpretation that could correspond to any fact, thing or person. At the same time, it is unlikely that knowledge exists without such a process of interpretation or codification, which happens even involuntarily.

Everything that is filtered by our senses receives a nominal categorization without us realizing it. This categorization supposes a distortion that, despite everything, is necessary to continue with the interpretative process. Likewise, since we only know in this way, any attempt to find a universal consensus based on distorting parameters that are contained in each member that makes up humanity becomes an exhausting task.

Because of the evidence of change and relativity, the only possible consensus is that there is no absolute consensus. All hermeneutics is situated and any reference of reality responds to a location in the world, as well as to a physical and affective distance kept towards things. The notions we have, to which we give the category of true, are found in our psyche and precede any attempt at rationalization, thus becoming a fundamental element for later associations and conjectures. We cannot completely circumvent this conglomeration of eidetic systems because only from them can

we structure our meanings of reality. How to escape from this limitation? Ceasing to seek the Truth and allowing us to grasp portions of nothing that invite us to contemplate the emptiness of our intellectual obsession.

Even phenomenology, in its effort to return to things themselves and observe with greater independence what happens around an event, is insufficient. We cannot simply remove, eradicate or discard our previous ideas about something, for with such notions we perform the interpretation. It is symptomatic to encounter witty phenomenologists who, on the assumption that they allow what has happened to be shown as it is, speak and express themselves with deluded objectivity about the facts, believing that they are exempt from the limits of their own distorting subjectivity. Pretending to be "objective", such individuals usually pour into their texts or narratives some final section in which they carefully offer the conclusive interpretations that are derived from their non-interpretative observations, allowing what in principle was sought to avoid emerge. Viewed coldly, we become innocent individuals seeking truths and playing objectivity.

The only thing left for us in front of the absolute of nothingness is to recognize it, because it implies the movement that makes it impossible for us to contact certainties. The hope of discovering the Truth does not allow us to discover nothingness. How to remove what covers nothing? If we really want to reveal we must assimilate what it is that remains veiled. Well, the veiled is nothingness and what covers it is all that *it is.* As ironic as it sounds, we will not find the Truth if we try to locate it by studying what it is, interpreting from experiences that have already happened, focusing on a reality that we assume is real, focused on what we have lived or the traditional ontological frames. On the contrary, what it is about is to enable a hermeneutic of nothingness, one in which it is sought to stop seeing what is normally seen in order to see or intuit what is not seen. Therefore, from seeing what is seen we indirectly reach what is not seen. The attitude of search is unnecessary, a receptive attitude is more optimal; there is nothing in itself that should be sought, but it is imperative to give greater importance to the attitude of openness that we need, because nothingness is inside and in front of each one.

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The hermeneutic of nothingness consists in stopping nominally making up the Truth, avoiding depositing it somewhere where it has no place, in order to allow space for the unmentionable; hermeneutics focused on emptiness focuses on all that can be. The idea of Truth is a hindrance, a fallacy that has made us hopeful for thousands of years as a human civilization. However, the only thing that is reiterated after each genuine search is that the Truth is not and that nothingness persists behind our longings; that nothingness could appear to be the Truth and we could easily be deceived, but that cannot be so. If nothingness were truth it would not be nothingness.

Assuming nothingness implies recognizing that there is something above the human, without this having to be a Someone. Enough humility is necessary to understand that no absolute Truth is within our reach, that every univocal search is vain and that there is no possibility of controlling everything with our concepts or of giving a universal character to our conclusions. Puerile is, in this tenor, to try to position in the abstract concept of absolute Truth a human form that makes it accessible. That, the common need to delineate the absolute through human categories, only proves the postulate of Protagoras, that we have endowed the report with our form or, in other words, infect our visions of the deity with humanity. We want the unknown to cease to be, and we disguise it in convenient ways to make it accessible to us. We seek that the absolute is in our likeness and that it has our forms, but that hinders the capture of the alternate to what we are, of the different to the being.

Ideologies are formed through specific codes and through various ways of conceiving the world; in turn, hermeneutics is the way for the interpretation of everything we see. When the processes of interpretation occur in automaton form, ideologies end up being accepted by most people without an exercise in reflection, in such a way that they become a perceptual custom. Education, when it becomes an uncritical accomplice of these processes, produces the institutionalization of a particular way of understanding the world, which is proposed (and imposed) officially and coercively on students.

Education is often seen as the solved panacea of contemporary problems, but it is neglected that not all education is truly liberating or convenient. Education also divides, also forges elites, also

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promotes passivity and social inequality. Understanding nothing implies relativizing the value of educational institutions and even the meaning and tendency of education. If education moves away from wisdom, it ends up being an instrument of ideologization and power. If what is learned only reiterates stagnane information, wisdom is hindered. Knowledge arises from criticality, from the willingness to see things from another perspective. And the most radical of the reconfigurations is to understand things from an inverse ontology, starting from their lightness, their ambiguity and faculty of change, leaving behind linearity and the univocal vision.

Nothingness and the liberation of linear and univocal learning

It is not a question of showing reasons for the children and young people of the world to stop attending an educational institution, what is involved is to assume that there are no truths, that it cannot be categorically affirmed that our knowledge is the Truth. It is true that accepting the above would mean a lower level of solemnity in the classrooms, but an alternate contemplative longing would be empowered.

It is proper for every human being to learn and it is not possible to subtract that possibility; however, all knowledge has some emptiness, since its reconstruction is always possible. There is nothing unquestionable, just as not only what we claim may be right. It is appropriate to broaden the perspective to something broader than being limited to a subject book. It is essential to recognize the possibility of contacting intimately with denial, of assuming ourselves as limited entities sustained in the immensity of nothingness. It is, in short, about learning without losing the ability to unlearn what has been learned.

Unlearning implies the ability to bring a new line to what is known, to modify the previous assumptions to open, from a different perspective, the understanding to other possibilities. Now, it is not enough just to unlearn, as if one forgot what has been learned, on the contrary: unlearning does not imply misunderstanding or forgetfulness, but the ability to question what is known and analyze it from other circumstances in which it could be false or inadequately cumbersome. Once we assume that what is known can be denied, then we can discern whether it is functional for us or,

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where appropriate, unlearn it. Unlearning leads to a new learning that replaces the previous one, thus building the necessary openness to maintain criticality in the face of the knowledge learned.

The ability to unlearn must also be learned. Although we already have a natural capacity for inquiry, we can lose it over the years due to the dogmatizations and moralizations received everywhere. Each person travels a path of indoctrination that can lead to learning that he will never lose or that he will manage to unlearn if he realizes the invalidity of such knowledge or assumptions. Everything is interpreted from our knowledge and ideas, but it is not logical to ensure that among all that there is not something that we must displace. Unlearning is a consequence of hierarchizing what we know, it is giving priority to some ideas over others and being able to remove from the throne of our preferences the learnings, schemes or concepts that no longer coincide with life itself.

The individual who chooses to unlearn the cumbersome things that do not allow him a more peaceful life will find himself faced with the challenge of dismantling the linearity of his own learning. However, what will be unlearned should be chosen with caution and reflection. For example, think of a young man who has learned that sex that does not seek reproduction of the species must be lived with contraceptive methods. If this individual dislikes using these methods he could unlearn those ideas because they are annoying to him; in this way, he could devote himself to living his sexuality in unprotected ways. In such a case we are not talking about an unlearning, but about an arbitrary discard of ideas that were not convenient, but this does not lead to an argument that support a new position; it is clear that the result will be harmful sooner or later.

On the contrary, the unlearning to which I refer must be based on necessary and sufficient arguments. For example, when a woman believes that her divorce is evidence of her failure in life and that she has nothing else to offer, she is being influenced by what she has learned about divorce. Modifying that idea would mean a relearning of what divorce is now for her or being ready to receive new benefits from her situation. Unlike the first example, in this one we find openness to a new learning (that of divorce), which derives from a new conscious significance.

To resignify is to give new content to something in particular. The new meaning is addressed to the connotative part of the concept, not to the denotative part, which is the basic reference of it.

If the word "cat" is mentioned in a group of people, it will be very likely that everyone present there knows what that expression refers to, since initially the attention is directed to the denotative sense of the *word.* But if I ask each of them what a cat means to them personally, then they can answer from a connotative sense, which implies a certain personal interpretation of what the cat is to them. The word "cat" can represent what they say; on the one hand, to the extent that this is the notion of a cat that everyone has, it is what they say; however, a cat, as such, does not submit to what they have said. A cat is not the idea of a cat you have. The same happens with the human: it is not what he thinks of himself, although the suggestion orilles him to act according to what he thinks and can become, apparently, what he believes of himself. In that sense, we can affirm the convenient conception that the human is more than what he does. Let us forget now the idea that man is known for his actions, fruits or achievements, for that is a terrible and short-sighted minimization.

Relearning requires the previous unlearning that led to a significance; therefore, relearning occurs in the connotative dimension of our knowledge of things. Taking this reflection to another point, the denotative arises from a kind of consensus that is not discussed and that is transmitted generationally; in this way, it is very complex to pretend that a denotative aspect is modified (it would not make sense to stop calling the cat a cat and now call it something else). What can be resignified is the connotation, regardless of the antecedent denotation that produces it.

It is unlikely that a connotative meaning will become denotative if it does not have adequate media coverage or reach. That is where the ability to doubt what has been learned takes on ample value. Another way to develop the capacity for unlearning and to favor new learning is holistic knowledge, which could also be called relational or, to some extent, systemic. In any case, understanding the broad meaning of words, we cannot conjecture that there is only one meaning of each of them or a single way of interaction between words. Each sentence spoken contains not only meanings per word, but a set of expressions that are given from the relationship of the words to each other and their position in a linguistic expression. It is evident that words could convey more meanings than we are able to grasp, and that even those captured could have been wrongly received.

Distortion is a derivation of this process. Attention should then be focused on the possibility of a meta-literal understanding of expressions.

Metalinguistic understanding

The link between notions and the words with which we designate them may not always be so obvious. It is necessary to distinguish whether our knowledge begins as a notion or if it is presented as an already established concept for what we observe sensorily. In a way, the words we use are a way to try to fill the silences we have in front of things, a way to dodge nothingness.

The learnings, located in the continuity of the past with the present, show the use of the word to decipher what we have learned; in this way, what we learn are concepts. If we restrict ourselves to conceptualizations we do not allow relational knowledge and they are soon forgotten. Now, is it really possible to learn something without the use of words or, better yet, without conceptualizing it? If words did not exist, then notions would remain in the realm of the subjective and there would be no social meanings of things, since in the absence of language there would be no society. In turn, without society there would be no one to communicate with and there would be no language. Similarly, if there were no context, an outside of ours, there would also be no notions generated by not having any contact from which to generate them.

If we try to imagine a man whose exteriority is null or who is not surrounded by something we will realize that it is impossible. From the moment we imagine a man with a body we have already made a trap, because the body constitutes an exteriority in itself, which facilitates contact with others. Every man has a notion of his body because it is an elementary part of his own distinction between it and what is outside of it. If it were possible for us to remove all outer matter from someone's body and eliminate all foreign bodies around them, that person could hardly have any notion of anything. We all form notions because we are beings with exteriority and we have a body to distinguish it. The only thing that has no externality is nothingness. Thus, nothingness cannot have notions because there is no place in which they are generated and there is nothing that is outside of it. Back to the question, it can be assumed that without language there would be no words and

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therefore there would be no concepts to decipher the notions, which would remain static in the mind of the person, without being able to be transmitted and much less socially consensual.

The term "signifiers" is useful to refer to everything external to man that is feasible to receive a word that labels him; the term "meaning" points to the labeling word or concept with which we nominate a particular thing; Finally, "signifiers" are individuals who use the meanings that label the signifiers. Thus, we find the following question: can a signifier (person who knows) have an idea of a signifier (knowable object) that is not already a meaning (label) that has involved the use of language? If the answer were yes, which I think, we could call the original idea "notion".

It is known that for some reality is socially constructed. However, reality is not what is socially constructed, but the meanings. What we do on a daily basis consists of a social construction of meanings. In turn, the signifiers or the signifier (the things there, the possible to contact) are not something constructed, but exist in themselves. On the other hand, "reality" is not the same as a signifier, in the manner of a fixed object to be known or a particular thing. In addition, a signifier requires a signifier, but since reality remains univocally univocal, reality could not be a fixed signifier. Reality, therefore, escapes a particular meaning and, in that sense, can be conceived as the container that gives rise to all meanings, more like a hole or a nothing than something defined. Likewise, around nothingness, therefore, there are no definitive meanings but only notions; therefore it is contacted through an experience with and through it, an experience that we could call contemplation.

In such an order of ideas, is every notion a conceptualized and therefore linguistic meaning or is a notion of a signifier possible without this implying the use of a word, that is, a meaning? More specifically, is the notion or the word first? To respond to this, I propose immediately to consider some possible alternatives.

1)   A first answer *is* that the notion is first. For example, when we want to ask a question, we have the notion of the question and then look for the words to articulate it. However, to formulate any question informed before we must have certain contents that propitiate it or from which it is derived. Many of these contents are usually read before generating a question. Therefore, based on the written words of other authors, certain notions are generated that we turn into questions. Therefore,

in the strict sense, the word of another is first than our notions. Had we not done some previous readings, surely some of our notions would not have been generated or would have had another channel. Even those who have not done any reading generate notions that turn into questions, but they do so after having heard others talk about something similar and, even in that case, the word of another propitiates the notion.

It is clear that not only notions are generated by listening to others, but also by various sensory paths. Seeing things also generates a response to them; for example, when seeing a painting by Leonardo da Vinci one could have an emotional response if there was a meaning before that prompts us to conclude mentally: "this is a painting by Leonardo". In such a case we cannot speak of a pure notion because there was already a concept that welcomed words. Now, do we have notions of things or are the meanings already pre-established? In the proposed example, if I didn't know that the painting I see is by a particular artist, my meaning would probably be vaguer and I would simply say, "it's a painting"; even so, that statement has included at least the meaning of what a painting is. I could also say that the picture is "beautiful", and in that case the word "beautiful" would in itself be my predisposition to enunciate with such a qualifier the observed picture. What generates that a notion becomes a meaning is what we call learning and that is where the collective question, the linguistic and the socially adopted comes into function. To return to the original notions of everything would have to erase the total set of learnings of the past, but achieving such a state of cognitive purity is impossible.

2) A second resulting possibility is that it *is first the word of others,* then the notion and then the *proper word.* Checking it carefully is also not sustainable. Even conceding that what allows us to have a notion of something are the words of authors who have written about it, it is not enough to conclude that it is first the word and then the notion, because if we conclude it like this we would lose sight of the fact that the authors themselves had a notion of what they were going to write, so it was not first the word, but the notion. From this it follows that to forge notions and meanings we need those of others, since we do not generate pure meanings, but we make variations to the already

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existing meanings. However, if we follow the notion-word configuration chain at a first point, the original word had to be detonated by some notion.

3)   It follows from what has been said that *the notion is first.* But let's test this assumption again. When a person has a notion of something it is because he is describing it to himself and such a process (describing for oneself the things one sees) consists of giving personal and intimate explanations about something, for which the use of words is necessary.

On some occasions, especially in speeches or written messages, the initial words that allowed our understanding are modified during the selective writing process, which involves the choice of "the right words" that we will use to capture the ideas on paper; such a process is different from that which is done immediately to signify the notion. It is one thing to instantly attribute words to notions and another to think about how to write the original idea in elegant ways. In both aspects the word comes into play, in the first case in a very primitive way and in the second in a more formal way, when thinking about what type of person the message is addressed to and including questions of style.

However, in both uses of the word, a thought process had to take place. In addition, there must have been a mastery of language that was the bearer or precursor of the notion. It is not possible to interpret something if it is not from similar meanings from which one can link or compare the new that is seen or known. Therefore, it would be worth reconsidering the supremacy of the word over the notion.

4)   *It is first the word and then the*notion. This proposal is supported by the argument that it is through words that one manages to explain what one sees and perceives. Words are a useful means of conveying what we grasp; even so, the conceiving of things with the intermediation of language distances us from the full and substantial meaning of many aspects that we claim to know.

Objective reality is, then, unnoticed or, in its case, barely intuited very partially. In any case we would have to talk about "subjective objectivities" and "objective objectivities"; the former are within our reach and the latter remain as the pure and unattainable alternative that constitutes the natural state of objectivity, which is destroyed and annihilated by attempting to subjectivation.

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This suggests that language is a distorting medium if with its exercise you want to achieve objectivity. However, although it seems that we have obtained the answer to the initial question about whether the notion or the word comes first, a new doubt arises: do we always use language as a decoder of reality? When someone burns they are feeling the burn after being told "I burned"? Do I only know that a person is beautiful if I place them with an adjective? Definitely not. Knowledge is not limited solely to the use of language.

5)   The fifth alternative is this: *there are aspects of knowledge that do not require language*intermediation. Theconcrete part of this is the "sensations", that is, what is known through the direct participation of the senses. What we see, what we hear (as long as they are not words) and what we perceive with touch implies a way of knowing without the intermediation of language. Emotions are excluded, since they are only possible after the untimely management of internal messages (words) that decode the events or sensations we perceive. Arrived here, we have two different terms: perception and interpretation, only in the first there is no need for words.

Now, because there are aspects that do not require the intermediation of language to be perceived-lived-assumed, there is a more categorical statement than the previous one, the sixth.

6)   *It depends on the palpable reality whether it is first the notion or the*word. This implies that our externality is palpable or perceived without words and then reconstructed, or interpreted, to understand it humanly through words; after that, the palpated can be transmitted (with selected words or by certain signs). When it comes to the processes of sensory contact, the notion arises first, then the words with which we describe it, and from this the significant notion will arise in those who listen to us or read us. With regard to hermeneutic processes, the word we read or hear is primeval; then the reactions that we will label with words happen.

The words of others are an occasion from which notions are generated in us. Early humans invented a certain language after grasping the notions they needed to label after their contact with the world and their awareness of it. Consciousness allows us the contact that fosters the notion from which we use the words we have learned. Thus, the first option, the one that held that the notion was prior to the use of the word, was not entirely incorrect, despite appearing as the simplest.

Referring to a strictly personal experience, the generality of humans did not greet the doctor who received us at birth. This obviousness assumes that we did not have familiar words to describe the notion that something was happening; that's probably why we don't remember such an event. However, we cannot maintain that words are required to *understand* certain notions, such as *knowing* that our mother's smile, even without speaking, showed acceptance. This can be referred to as metalinguistic understanding, which can be pre-rational or post-rational. Finally, it should be distinguished that it is not the same to have consciousness than to have notions, because we can be aware or not of the notions, or have (or not) notion of our consciousness.

The context of expression and its influence on meaning

There are voluntary processes in which we define the way we call what we know. However, even in conscious processes we are still influenced by the antecedent linguistic determination of things through what we have learned. We adapt to words whose meaning we assume is similar to what we imagine wanting to say. This means that complexity increases as a function of words being polysemic. Imagine the chaos that would be generated if we all began to call "down" what is "up" or "small" what is "big" or "good" what is "bad" (it is more usual than we think); although we are subject to language, this is always a contextual reference. For example, while Makalu Mountain is larger than Manaslu Mountain (both in the Himalayas), it is also true that Makalu is smaller than Everest. Well, is Makalu Mountain big or small? Depends on. Certainly Everest is the largest mountain if we follow the parameter of measuring it from sea level, but if we consider the length of Mauna Kea Mountain in Hawaii, starting from the ocean floor, it would be "bigger".

As you can see, adjectives require a counterpart and a parameter of comparison to make sense, that is why we could not conceive of the "up" without the "down", nor the "inside" without the "outside"; if we follow these last assessments, what could we answer about whether we are outside or inside us? For example, is the reader outside your home or inside? If it's inside your home, either way, it's outside someone else's. If you are outside your home, you are still "inside" a country. At the same time, it is outside one country and inside another. Can anyone be out of the world?

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Outside the body? Inside someone else? Inside a rock? At the same time inside and outside, at the same time both and none. The same with respect to goodness and evil or the whole series of dichotomies that we have considered as humans. As we can see, linguistic references are always subject to a context.

This happens not only with regard to adjectives, but also with proper nouns; for example, again in reference to Everest, although it is called Sagarmatha in Nepal or Chomolungma in China, it is located in the West with the surname of the British George Everest. If we ask ourselves for a word to decipher that mountain we could have all three or none; the mountain *is* something that does not admit a word in total form, although right here it has been obvious that we have had to call it "mountain". Words are invention, fine fiction.

However, in the academic world, the use of language is fundamental. Critical inquiry consists of interpretations and reinterpretations of the things we see. The support of all interpretation is the meanings at the base of which are the concepts that would not exist without words. That is why communication is an inescapable social issue. In any verbal exchange it would be advisable to understand what we mean and then look for a way to say it through codes and symbols. But not everything is communicable and not everything is academic.

The strictly empirical is associated with reflex consciousness, with the notion. The original, even wordless, meaning of fire will be changed from "something shiny" to "something that burns"; their meaning may or may not have words, but, even before them, the experience of burning is a notion. Such a baby might say "ay" every time he sees the fire; that "ay" is already his phonetic representation of fire and, in this case, the notion would have come first than the word. If then this protagonist baby atina to say "fuelo" and then "fire", to the extent that that is the name he hears that we have given to what burns him, he manages to use words. Like him, we have adapted our notions to collective distortion. If we are aware of such a process we acquire a reflective awareness of ourselves.

Thus, if what we know are not ideas or things that are external, but ourselves, we will have to look among the existing meanings for a way to perceive ourselves. Even without the existence of

another in front of us, it is not possible to evade the collective consciousness through the use of the language, meanings or codes from which we define ourselves.

The way in which a person observes himself, even without the presence of another nearby human, is not exempt from the social question and the almost endless series of concepts and ideas that serve as parameters of self-definition. In that sense, self-knowledge is nothing more than a model, a false label with which we go through life naively assuming that we know who we are. Similarly, any knowledge one has about anything constitutes a distortion of reality. Do we still seek freedom? Probably the condemnation of freedom consists more in assuming that we must seek it than in the fact of possessing it itself.

No one should be forced to believe definitively in all the meanings that he has adopted from the outside and that have conditioned his original notions. But, in the same way, we cannot force any person to be totally incommunicado or to remain in solitude with their own incommunicable notions, because that would break their socialization and the externalization of their knowledge of the world.

The meanings are not correct in themselves, they are a label that is never what is labeled. The existence of another and its labels can never justify one's existence because the words of others are not our own. The matter leads us to note that no individual manages to be a justification of his own existence since oneself is an existing one who labels things and labels himself. What justifies life could not be the label we put on it. In fact, those that we consider as the words themselves are not ours either, not even the use or accommodation we give them. Even in creative writing, the absolute ownership of what he does not write could be doubted, since several connections of ideas and concepts happen spontaneously that generate an almost symbiotic connection between the notion of the author and his words, which speaks of his cultural programming.

If we are to decide between what is more ours than between notions or words (perhaps more important than the distinction about what happens first), first, we will have to recognize that notions are really more intimate and that they are, by themselves, non-transferable. It is desirable, at least for moments, to return to notions and discontinue our perceptions, leaving aside our need for conceptual control. I do not claim here that we omit to speak and leave the words in disuse (if so I

could not write this article), the point is to assume that the words never contain the entire notions and that, even, the notions do not contain reality.

We need to communicate and we require language, but we have become accustomed to absolutizing it dramatically. That is why it is appropriate to consider the partial liberation of the linguistic as an alternative of understanding the world, the other and ourselves. For centuries we have assumed that we humanize ourselves by categorizing everything around us in order to control our knowledge. We have ceased to understand from the perspective of the unsnameable emptiness that is in everything. Nothingness is also an alternative from which one can understand the world, the other or oneself; the metalinguistic and mephenomenical path represents a laudable option if we grasp that, sometimes, the best way to understand something is to destroy it until it does not exist.

It is true that speaking people understand each other, but in silence there could be some understanding of oneself. It is imperative to note that, being human construction, what we have represented as "the truth" implicitly contains a substantial fallacy. It is convenient to consider a hermeneutic path focused on emptiness, one in which the option is to return to the space without words, because it is there, in the silence that surrounds us, and which we want to fill with improper and distorting words, where we have a notion of what we are: a nothingness that longs to echo the great Silence ofNothingness.

References

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