**An approach to modernity. Coexistence as a possibility of school education.**

Una aproximación a la modernidad. La convivencia en tanto posibilidad de enseñanza escolar.

**DOI:** 10.32870/synchrony.axxv.n79.27to21

**Eduardo Solano Vázquez**

Doctorate in Education. University of Guadalajara (MEXICO)

**CE:** pumalibro@hotmail.com /  **ORCID ID:**  0000-0002-3038-0142

**This work is licensed under a** [*Creative Commons Attribution-NonCoercial 4.0 International License*](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.es)

**Received:** 02/03/2020

**Reviewed:** 22/10/2020

**Accepted:** 10/11/2020

**ABSTRACT**

The text addresses the issue of modernity, its consequences and the way in which ethics and school can contribute to the orientation of living together in this modern moment. In this sense, although modernity has caused disenchantment, in the sense that instrumental reason became the parameter of the world, to the degree of technifying it in the extreme, that does not have to lead to the renunciation of reason, freedom and living together

The reference to ethics and school, is made so that through them, coexistence in this stage of modernity is outlined. In this sense, thought is limited to longing, but it cannot be dismissed, because although it does not respond to a techno-scientific rationality, it does not cease to be reasonable. In this sense, it is important to be reasonable, above all, in this moment of modernity where what predominates is disenchantment, absurdity and emptiness.

**Keywords**: Modernity. Reason. Ethics. School.

**RESUMEN**

El texto aborda el asunto de la modernidad, sus consecuencias y la manera en que la ética y la escuela pueden contribuir en la orientación de la convivencia en este momento moderno. En este sentido, si bien la modernidad ha ocasionado el desencanto, en el sentido de que la razón instrumental se convirtió en el parámetro del mundo, al grado de tecnificarlo en extremo, eso no tiene que llevar a la renuncia de la razón, la libertad y la convivencia.

La referencia a la ética y la escuela, se hace para que, a través de ellas, se perfile la convivencia en esta etapa de la modernidad. En este sentido, el pensamiento se encuentra ceñido a la añoranza, pero ella no puede ser desestimada, pues, aunque no responde a una racionalidad tecno-científica, no por ello deja de ser razonable. En este sentido, es importante ser razonable, sobre todo, en este momento de la modernidad en donde lo que predomina es el desencanto, el absurdo y el vacío.

**Palabras Clave**: Modernidad. Razón. Ética. Escuela.

"Regardless of whether we are modern or not.

we live in a modern society."

(Bauman, 2009)

**Introduction**

The text focuses on the issue of modernity and the way of being that unfolds in social and historical time-space. Likewise, ethics and school are also addressed, which allows us to think about the coexistence between the self-another in this stage of modernity. Now, the coexistence between the self and the other is an important aspiration in ethical terms, but one that can be ridiculed by disenchanted thinking. Thus, it is hoped that thought will regain its critical capacity, so that it will dismantle the absurd and the void, which leave no possibility to be placed socially and historically, to think and act in the present.

It is important to point out what each of the sections that make up the writing consist of. Thus, the first section gives an account of modernity as a cultural-civilizational structure, which is sustained by reason, the secularization of time, freedom, science and progress. Modern reason has the characteristic of organizing the space, which means that no loose ends are left. On the other hand, it is appropriate to express that modernity is the promise of making the human race progress.

The second section deals with the criticism that is poured into modernity, to the extent that its promise of emancipation was set aside, and progress was limited to the technification of the world. In this sense, we speak of the disaster caused by instrumental reason, which does not mean that the reconstruction of the social and historical world can occur through irrationalism, on the contrary, it is cardinal to recover reason and transfer it to its critical dimension.

The third section gives an account of the way in which reason can contribute to the coexistence between the self-other. In addition, it is considered that through reason in its critical derivation it is possible to bury the thought that only sees means and not ends, since this way of thinking makes the coexistence between the I-other unfeasible, to the extent that its relationship is exhausted when it is considered that some utility is no longer obtained. Now, critical reason thinks about the relationship between the self-other with the intention of establishing coexistence, therefore, it is required that the self-other be assumed as an end in itself.

The fourth section includes the reflections given in the first three parts of the writing to address them through the school. In this sense, we must take into account that, the school is a modern institution, it also has the feats and absurdities of modernity as a cultural-civilizational structure. Likewise, if in this writing it is considered that the school can still give of itself to teach and detonate the coexistence between the self-other, it is because it is trusted that the school can reconstruct the promise of emancipation and freedom that modernity postulated in its beginnings, obviously, such principles have to be resignified, so that they make sense in this stage of modernity.

The last section is the conclusion of the text, which insists on not abandoning reason, but on dissociating itself from instrumental reason and scientific, political, and social reductionisms. In this commitment to critical reason and the coexistence between the self-another strengthened by the school, longing is shown, here the question cannot be evaded, if you want to be consistent with critical reason. There is no return, the initial sense of modernity cannot be fully recovered, but neither can we return to the tribal era. In this sense, what remains is to reconstruct the thought-action in order to be able to inhabit the present. That is, social and historical time has to be occupied, in turn, we have to act, so that in it the relationship between the self-other is aimed at being long-lasting, that it coexists and disagrees, because the agreements that are not discussed standardize and reduce the thought-action. Likewise, while generating a pedagogical institution appropriate to this stage of modernity, it is essential to trust in the school and its teaching capacity. This is historical, therefore, the meaning of the school is not limited to the immutable and can help to reconfigure and inhabit the present.

**Modernity: cultural-civilizational structure**

Modernity secularizes time-space, so it requires a civic morality to amalgamate, justify and give meaning to the individual-social actions that arise in it (Touraine, 1994). In this sense, the time-space of modernity has the conditions to sustain the ideal of progress. Likewise, modernity is a structured whole, in other words, science, business, technology; they go in search of progress and consider that everything is susceptible to being improved (an improvement of the quasi-perpetual world).

The secularization of time-space and the ideal of progress will lead to the notion of historical experience having a place in modernity. Thus, the finite will bury the transcendent and the essences are not required in a cultural-civilizational stage that gives priority to reason while it is able to argue only in relation to what it observes. On the other hand, modernity sees in the school the right institution to promote its principles: reason, science, progress:

The education of the individual must be a discipline that frees him from the narrow, irrational vision imposed on him by his own passions and his family, and opens him to rational knowledge and participation in a society that organizes reason. The school must be a place of rupture with respect to the environment of origin and a place of openness to progress by the work of knowledge and participation in a society founded on rational principles. (Touraine, 1994, p. 20)

Modernity is impossible without rational and free individuals, who strip themselves of custom and separate themselves from their communities of origin, since the modern social pact is based on laws, which are impersonal (universalizable) and seek to be beneficial to the individual and society. In this sense, modernity promotes equality before the law and also a democracy at the governmental level. Thus, modern egalitarianism displaces the hierarchy of medieval society, which owes preference to kings, princes and priests.

Modern reason will choose to organize the world through functions (Löwy and Sayre, 2008). In that sense, modern reason is operative, so this kind of reason is not contemplative, but instrumental. Thus, it is necessary for the individual and society to intervene with their actions in the construction of the modern project and, therefore, in the consummation of the ideal of progress.

The modern project represents optimism in the face of a cultural-civilizational context that still had the consequences of the Middle Ages. However, the individual does not delay in realizing that reason, science and technology are insufficient to achieve the realization of the ideal of progress, but he does not give up his work to build and achieve as far as possible progress and disseminate it in the social-cultural spheres. In this sense, progress contains utopian elements, even if it is sustained by a reason that organizes and makes society function as if it were a machine. On the other hand, it is foolish to maintain that, in modernity, there have been no manifestations of progress:

It is undeniable not only that many of the developments of modernity are irreversible, both at the level of the individual and of society or the economy, but also that some of them represent important acquisitions for historical progress and contributions to the fullness – yet to be achieved – of the human race. (Löwy and Sayre, 2008, p. 244)

Modern science and technology are also related to the capitalist mode of production. In this sense, science and technology have to produce commodities. Thus, reason is measured by the rule of utility, so knowing that it is not capable of being useful for organizing society or for strengthening the capitalist mode of production becomes irrelevant and obsolete.

In modernity it is not enough to have historical consciousness, and it cannot be measured. That is, there is a lack of criteria to establish who has more or less historical consciousness. However, the historical experience of the individual and society can be observed and measured through the development of their legal, economic and, above all, their scientific and technological contributions. Modern reason relies on the visible, for what is seen is what can be modified-improved, to meet the needs of the individual, society and the economy.

While it is true that modernity has a tendency towards the new, in no way can it be said that, it creates from nothing a civilization. In this sense, it is appropriate to indicate that modernity also reads and appropriates a tradition (the Greco-Latin), but adapts it to the context of society that develops within the scope of industrialization (Giddens, 1994).

The modern reason that has supplanted the idea of an omnipresent God and who also trusts in the freedom of the individual and society, will not leave loose ends, so it will monitor the individual and society through schools, hospitals. In this way, individual and social actions cannot be of absolute freedom, because if so, there is a risk that the social pact will dissolve. Without a social pact, progress becomes superfluous, since this is the rational manifestation of a historical experience. Likewise, it should not be forgotten that modernity is a structured totality, although not necessarily harmonious:

I suggest that we should replace those images of modernity with those of juggernaut – the image of a runaway machine of enormous power which, collectively as human beings, we can handle to some extent, but which also threatens to escape control, the way it would shatter us. The juggernaut crushes those who resist it, and if it sometimes gives the impression of maintaining a firm balance, there are times when it veers erratically in unpredictable directions. (Giddens, 1994, p. 132)

The modern cultural-civilizational stage can show signs of decadence. However, we must bear in mind that modernity emerged as a movement of rupture with the established (Touraine, 1994). In this sense, modernity gestates its self-destruction to reinvent itself. That is, the guiding ideas of modernity: reason, freedom, progress; they are adapted to the historical situation. Now, if modernity is considered as a machine, then it is opportune to think that, it also adjusts to continue working and when it definitely expires, it serves as a model for the creation of a more efficient machine.

If modernity is a cultural-civilizational stage that still persists, it is because it has the expertise to show itself as a way of being. In this sense, his historical experience is not only sustained by reason, science and economics; it also has in its way of governing society one of its strongholds. However, democracy is formally inclusive, since it tends to citizenship of each individual, regardless of their socio-economic conditions or ethnic identity.

In modernity there is the phenomenon of the social division of labor, which requires a specialization for economic activities, so it is no longer enough to be an apprentice in a workshop while work is also based on scientific reason, hence a basic requirement is that everyone knows how to read and write. On the other hand, modern society is quantitatively large, so the state becomes the central institution of politics (Gellner, 2001). Likewise, there is no room for a policy that accounts for cultural differences, in addition, the State is made up of free citizens who have left behind their particular communities and customs in order to achieve the historical (universal) experience that allows them to achieve progress.

Progress is a modern aspiration or ideal, but the ideal for modernity is that it is a real manifestation, for this to be so, it is necessary that society is cohesive, because progress is difficult in a fragmented society. In this sense, one of the objectives of the modern State is to create a national culture that allows the consummation of progress:

The nationalist state is not only the protector of a culture, but also of a new, and often at first fragile, economy. (You usually stop being interested in protecting a creed.) In cases where a modern nation is born of what had previously been only a stratum—exclusively of peasants or exclusively of urban specialists—the dual interest of the state in making its ethnic group a balanced nation and in developing its economy becomes two aspects of a single and unique task. (Gellner, 2001, p. 146)

Modernity is not a cultural-civilizational stage immune to shortcomings. However, this cultural-civilizational stage has set the tone during the last centuries. On the other hand, although reason cannot solve everything, it cannot be renounced either, because if it does, there is a risk of falling into the realm of the instinctive, and there is no longer the possibility to distinguish good from evil.

**Critique of the cultural-civilizational structure of modernity**

Modernity emerges in the West as a movement of rupture, being more specific, the emergence occurs in Central Europe. Likewise, a goal of modernity is to universalize European culture. However, cultural-civilizational progress was absorbed by the spread of the economic system, which has reached beyond European soil (Echeverría, 2008). In this sense, one of the criticisms of the cultural-civilizational structure of modernity is poured towards the technical and economic progress of society, to the extent that they promote the gestation of socio-economic inequality.

The thinker Walter Benjamin makes use of metaphor, in this way, it is possible to think of modernity with the image of a system of mirrors, which is a producer of illusion (Benjamin, 2008). In this sense, economic and technical progress is an illusion, but it is also a catastrophe, which manifests itself in the individual and social life of man. Social exclusion is a catastrophe, because those who suffer from it are established outside of history:

The angel of history must have that aspect. His face is turned to the past. In what appears to us as a chain of events, he sees a catastrophe, which throws ruin upon ruin at his feet, piling them up endlessly. The angel would like to stop, awaken the dead and recompose what has been destroyed. But a hurricane blows from paradise and swirls on its wings, and it is so strong that the angel can no longer fold them. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 44)

Modernity is a machine that sweeps away, in addition, those who resist it are taken to nothing (Giddens, 1994), and being in nothing implies lacking time-space, which makes it impossible to achieve experience in history, which tends towards progress. That is, to be in modernity, it is necessary that modern principles be upholded and practiced: reason, science, technique, freedom. However, these principles have also been appropriated by capitalism, in that sense, it is not enough to make use of reason and freedom in themselves. In other words, reason and freedom have no value in themselves, in the understanding that they have been brought into the realm of the instrumental, hence if they have a place in modernity, it is because some utility is extracted from them. Likewise, reason and freedom depreciate in a cultural-civilizational stage that only values them under the criterion of economic utility.

Time-space without a voice naming it is meaningless. Now, modern time-space has the imprint of progress, because the thought and eye of modern man express and see progress everywhere, hence even savages can be incorporated into civilization, as long as they learn to behave.

The thinker Jacques Rancière argues that, the time in which man carries out his activities and appropriates space is a narrative (Rancière, 2017), for him any man capable of making a narrative can appropriate time-space. In this sense, Rancière is going to make a critique of modern time, to the extent that it passes itself off as the non plus ultra:

The causal rationality of the temporal link between events is tied to a hierarchical distribution of temporalities, which is a distribution of life forms [...] Modernity is linked to the vertical dimension of time, which implies its role in the distribution of the sensitive [...] Time is a form of distribution of human beings, a mode of division between two forms of life. (Rancière, 2017, p. 15 and 42)

Modern time is more than a conception, since, with its representation of the world, it also manages to stipulate how experience in history must be. Likewise, a reason that only trusts what it observes, cannot do without experience, since it can be improved or in an extreme case discarded, especially when it no longer says something useful about the world. In the age of the useful there is a risk of being a waste in the next process.

The critique of the cultural-civilizational structure of modernity has no meaning and power, if what it seeks is to erase everything that bears the label of modernity. In this sense, renouncing reason is a mistake, since it leads to the realm of the merely instinctive. The critique of time and modern progress does not intend to return to the past, nor to build a civilization from nothing, its radicality consists in remembering that, reason and human action is of its own limited, therefore, in the eagerness to want to exceed the limit, because reason and human action fall into the absurd. In this sense, criticism seeks to reveal the absurdities of modernity.

Reason not only has to be used to organize the world, but also to clarify it as far as possible (Rancière, 2010). That is, it is not enough with instrumental reason, critical reason is also required, so that it contains excess, which is manifested through the total technification of the world and in the absolute naturalization of it.

The critique of the cultural-civilizational structure of modernity is a way of reasonably "positioning" oneself around the discomforts that modernity causes and has caused in the socio-political sphere: inequality, exclusion. However, a critique that seeks to deny modernity or that seeks to establish itself as the only model of criticism with respect to modernity, what it favors is a depreciation of criticism and that does not contribute to the clarification of words and things:

There is no theoretical passage from the modernist critique of postmodern nihilism. It is only a question of reading in another sense the same equation of reality and image, of wealth and poverty [...] The problem is not to oppose reality to their appearances. It is to construct other realities, other forms of common sense, that is, other space-time devices, other communities of words and things, of forms and meanings. (Rancière, 2010, p. 48 and 102)

Modernity has built a reality that has conditioned human thought and action. In other words, the way in which one thinks and acts in the modern cultural-civilizational stage is leaving the sign of its presence, therefore, although the generations are relieving each other, modernity does not cease to manifest itself. In this sense, it can be said that, the cunning of modernity has been rooted in the following: modernity in its condition of structured totality, gives room to the disenchantments of culture and civilization, as long as they arise and perish in it, because in that way it has things under control. Likewise, modernity made the idea of a world created by God trisas, but it did not renounce the idea of creation, only now it is in charge of doing what was previously considered caused by divinity. In this sense, modernity is a utopia where reason and progress serve as the levers of history.

Knowledge was no longer exclusive to the monasteries, since they were not constituted to democratize it. It should not be forgotten that, in modernity, it is essential that everyone knows how to read and write. Thus, knowledge in modernity is under the power of the school (Horkheimer, 1973), it is not a trifle that knowledge has been torn from the monastery, to place it in the school. That is, modernity required creating an institution that would represent and defend its project around the progress of the world.

Science does not arise in modernity, but in it it is separated from its esoteric and enigmatic dimension, it is no longer a science revealed only to the elect. In the age of democracy, science can be developed by believers and atheists. However, the laudability of democratizing science also brought with it scientism, that is, considering that everything depends on science or that the world as a whole is science, leaving adrift or subordinating the method of science to other ways of accessing knowledge (philosophy, art):

Like all established faith, science can also be used in the service of the most diabolical social forces and scientism is no less narrow than militant religion [...] Science should expect philosophical thinking, as stated by philosophers or scientists, to be accountable about the nature of truth, rather than simply singing praises to scientific methodology as the supreme definition of truth. (Horkheimer, 1973, p. 82 and 84)

Modernity has led to the valuation of the world being governed by the parameter of what is useful, the above is valid both for the field of science and for that of social relations. Thus, what is not productive is the object of waste, it seems that this does not affect man and his way of positioning himself in the world. However, when things and living beings (including man) have value only because of how useful they are, because invoking the truth becomes nonsense, indeed, in a world that is ruled by utility, truth loses meaning. Likewise, where there is no truth, opinions swarm, which erect small empires and make dialogue and communication difficult; in short, intersubjective and social coexistence.

**Reason and coexistence in modernity**

The use of reason gives viability to the management of passions, it does not eliminate them, but containing them is enough (Spinoza, 2011). It is not trivial to seek restraint, especially if one considers that man is not only with himself, but is also with other men in society. In other words, although man is also a passionate being, he cannot be at all times, since he lives in society and this in order not to get lost in immediacy has to establish rules to interact.

One of the characteristics of society is that it coerces, but when those who make up society make use of reason, they understand that coercion is also to achieve coexistence. That is, if it were allowed to do everything dictated by appetites and will, living together would be impossible inso far as what one wants, does not resemble what the other is wanting. In this sense, appetites and will cannot be the foundation of coexistence, hence it is crucial that reason is the principle for life in common:

Men, I say, can desire nothing more excellent to preserve their being than to agree on all things in such a way that the souls and bodies of all compose as one soul and one body and strive all at once, to preserve their being and seek all at once for themselves the useful common to all; from which it follows that men who are governed by reason, that is, men who seek what is useful to them under the guidance of reason, do not desire anything for themselves that they do not desire for other men and, therefore, are just, loyal and honest. (Spinoza, 2011, p. 194 and 195)

Modernity says of itself that it is based on reason, but it has leaned more towards calculation and the instrumental. Likewise, the common good is not directed among those who share the same historical and social space, since conversation becomes impossible in multitudinous societies, in which anonymity prevails. However, it cannot be forgotten that achieving an agreement regarding the common good would help reason to recover its critical mood, since it would channel the individual and society towards a cultural-civilizational context where science and technology are at the service of man; in what has been mentioned, there is something of utopia, but it is not the end, since projecting another way of being in the world from the individual and social dimension allows man to distinguish himself from other beings and, above all, to separate himself from a thought-action that everywhere sees means and not ends.

Life in society cannot have only scientific, technological and economic development as a criterion of well-being. However, it is also known that there is no return, thinking about recovering tribal or alien ways of life from modern influence, is nothing more than a perspective conditioned by melancholy and conservatism. On the other hand, to renounce a life in common and to the interpellation, is to continue giving room to the technification of the world, and it is also to put into disuse the responsibility of man with himself and with what surrounds him.

Reason has to contribute to making the distinction between good and evil, for this criteria are needed, which, as far as possible, have to be established through consensus in reference to the common good of a historically situated society. The distinction of good and evil must be made to avoid harming the other, as this also becomes social contempt (Bauman, 2009); in other words, when someone is harmed, he loses dignity in the eyes of others, who can look at him with compassion, but not as an equal:

Helping one another may involve sacrifices, but sacrifice is intrinsic to morality. It doesn't matter if the benefit derived from this sacrifice comes now or in the future, or in the afterlife. The important thing is that I have contributed to the continuity of that group, whose success is measured by good and righteousness [...] Morality is the assistant of existence for the reason that governs it. Morality is what a reasonable being would choose as a reasonable being and reasonable. (Bauman, 2009, p. 55)

Critical reason breaks into time-space that gives priority to the profitable, hence this type of reason tends to be considered dysfunctional and improper. That is, one hears old mena lie to sacrifice, responsibility and also to appeal to a reason that thinks beyond the means and gives importance to the ends: man is an end and not a means, as Emmanuel Kant pointed out. However, now the end requires spreading beyond man and his social environment, because given the historical conditions it is unavoidable to take care of nature, but not as a purification of consciousness or mere pastime, but as a responsibility with the present and the future (with those who live and those who are about to live).

The encounter that can occur between the self and the other, is not exempt from violence, to assume that with the fact that the self and the other come together in a space, they will improve their own situations and intersubjective and social relations, is not to take into account that, coexistence is desirable, but also a challenge, which demands patience and even empathy. Likewise, living together is sustained by the responsibility that the self is capable of exercising both for itself and for the other. In this sense, responsibility is a worthy burden (Levinas, 2008), because it enables a coexistence that does not require violence to be.

The coexistence between the self and the other is ethically and socially desirable. However, a question arises: are the conditions in place for the individual and society to no longer be governed solely by the rule of utilitarianism? The relationship between me and the other cannot be reduced to exchange, because when one of the two is no longer able to give, then forgetfulness comes or in an extreme case annihilation. Likewise, the encounter between the self and the other allows us to look at the face, and when you know someone's face it is already difficult to consider it only as a means:

Morality has an independent and preliminary scope. The first philosophy is an ethic [...] It is not possible to deduce from what I have just said any underestimation of reason and of reason's aspiration to universality. I am only trying to deduce the need for the rational social as I describe it. It is extremely important to know whether society, in the ordinary sense of the term, is the result of a limitation of the principle according to which man is a wolf to man, or whether, on the contrary, it results from the limitation of the principle according to which man is for man. (Levinas, 2008, p. 65 and 69)

In the realization of the coexistence of men with each other, the ideal would be to opt for the principle of man is for man. However, the probability that this is indeed the case, is minimal, because the facts indicate that men are often considered in competition, in that situation, what is worth is who has the most capacity to adapt to the circumstances. Now, all is not lost, for as reasonable and not only instinctive beings, men can distinguish good from evil, and thus understand that evil can be avoided.

Trust tends to end, when what is trusted has not given what was expected of it. In this sense, after the optimism that reason aroused (Spinoza, Kant trusted that reason would make man better), now we are in a situation of disenchantment, because reason fell into irrationalism, since modernity abandoned its critical project (Rivas, 2013). However, disenchantment is equal to or more counterproductive than irrationalism, because it allows situations to pass, since for a disenchanted there is only emptiness, hence intervention in the world, considers it unnecessary.

Disenchantment also leads to a negative suspension of judgment, which makes it impossible to distinguish between good and evil. A disenchanted also dispenses with the criteria to recognize in the other a human being who thinks, longs, feels. Thus, the disenchantment and technification of the world do not give room to humanity as an expression of historical and social reality; on the one hand, the disenchanted renounces to intervene and also refuses contact with historically and socially existing humanity; on the other hand, technification considers that humanity is a childhood lure and unproductive of its own:

We must commit ourselves to a sense. But for it to be authentic, from a human point of view, it must make us turn our gaze to the human being, to his dignity and his inherent rights [...] When we talked about meaning and its relationship with value, the human being is the criterion of value; it is he who gives meaning. From a secular point of view, the human being is the only sacred thing we have and as sacred it is improfanable. (Rivas, 2013, p. 85 and 86)

Thought that expresses notions such as those of humanity and coexistence can be considered everlasting. However, thinking knows that reason, that is, the ability to make distinctions and establish criteria, can also be used to achieve a better stay for man in his individual and social condition. Likewise, coexistence is not inscribed in the DNA, so a propaedeutic of coexistence is required, which can be granted by the school, since it continues to have credibility. It is necessary to point out that, today as yesterday, human life requires criteria of coexistence, which allow existence to be realized, without it being crossed by destruction and violence.

**School and credibility: rethinking coexistence**

The importance of making history of ideas does not lie in presenting them only in their periodic sequence, but in understanding them through context. In this sense, the school has ecclesiastical elements (Noro, 2006), but the objectives of the school are different from those of the church; thus, their similarity is in terms of forms, but they differ by the contents and objectives. Now, if the contents-objectives are historical, you can still have a minimum of trust in the school, and thus, assign it the task of resignifying reason, freedom, coexistence, dialogue; although this task requires the help of society and above all of man, its intervention will be paramount in the construction of meaning requested by the school at this stage of modernity, which continues to shape and summon man in his individual and social condition.

Modernity has created its institutions, its inventive spirit is undoubted and it is what has allowed it to endure. Likewise, the school is the irrefutable proof that modernity is also a pedagogical culture (Vázquez, 2000), in the sense that it teaches its values through the didactic method. In this way, chance has no place in a civilizational cultural stage that gives priority to reason.

The school is questioned because as an institution of modernity, it has also prioritized instrumental reason. However, the school still maintains some credibility and it is about it that coexistence is thinkable, and from there, life in common can be reconfigured, because without a minimum of guidelines to live with others, everything can become absurd and empty. However, coexistence is not idyllic, because to consider that everyone must agree is to reduce thought and existence to conformism. However, there are issues on which there must be agreements: "Legitimacy is not built by slogan, or the mere presence of convergent interests. It is necessary for its construction the mediation of shared values and symbols" (Vázquez, 2000, p. 184). Thus, a value for life in common could be the respect for life that unfolds in the social and historical space, which means that care should be taken so that everyone can be without hardship.

The questions are not fruitless, even if they are not always accurate. Now, is it worth asking, does school still make sense? Do the goals of the school only have to be about scientific and technological knowledge? The school has educated to perfect man, at least, that has been its first task, considering that modernity is a pedagogical culture: "The enlightenment will try to replace the supernatural with the natural, religion with science, and will fervently believe in the perfectibility of man" (Tello, 2010, p. 1). Perhaps at this stage of modernity, it is no longer a question of seeking the perfectibility of man, but of seeking man without more, that is, that man can differentiate himself from science, technology and nature, if he succeeds, he will be able to find himself and know what he is, with that knowledge that is not scientific, he can try to forge a life for himself and also a coexistence alien to reductionisms.

Socio-historical time is transitive. Thus, thinking about coexistence requires considering the present, but not as pure actuality, but as the temporality where the encounter between the self and the other exists and is possible. That is, if it still makes sense to talk about individual and social improvement projects, they have to refer to the now, because allusions to the future are only illusions. Likewise, the school must help to guarantee the present, in the sense of making it possible for man to meet and, in addition, assume his responsibility with what surrounds him.

Modernity and school are a particular condition of history (Mariano, Conforti and Casado, 2012). Thus, reason has not always been related to science and education has not been exclusive to the school either. However, abruptly undoing modernity and school can be counterproductive, in the sense of not having references to build history and its senses. On the other hand, the school is perhaps the last utopia of the project of enlightened modernity with an emancipatory vocation, which still persists in late modernity: "The school is modern but the context is postmodern" (Mariano, et. al, 2012, p. 360). The school can no longer be a machine of education, in the sense of seeking to homogenize in its entirety the students, but neither can it stop instilling ideas that enable coexistence and the gradual improvement of it. In this sense, a Robinson, today as yesterday is only a model, but education is always about someone historically situated.

Coexistence and life in common are part of the diffuse concepts in that they can refer to the essentialist and unalterable, or also, to the undifferentiated given the massification of beings and things in democratic capitalism (Torres, 1997). However, if one renounces a project of life in common, there will no longer be a possibility for equality, difference, freedom; in short, for politics in the broad sense: "Faced with the market and nationalization, the public allows the recognition of the common and enables the development of the individual and the different" (Torres, 1997, p. 11). On the other hand, the school can educate reason, so that its judgments go beyond the instrumental realm. That is, the meaning of the school can turn, you can not be of fragile memory and forget that, she knows how to teach; but now his teaching would have as one of its objectives: to promote critical reason, to avoid as far as possible reductionisms, which lead to the incommunicable and without communication coexistence has no possibility of really manifesting.

There is a residue of longing in the fact of thinking that the school educates in critical reason, not only to bring thoughts and actions to the court of doubt, but to enable coexistence and promote the ability to distinguish good from evil, so that coexistence is not for mere convenience, because when it disappears, the being of the self with the other, loses its motive. However, longing is the prelude to the projection of what you want to do and also what you want to become. Now, the school as a specialized institution (Tool, 2020) is still plausible, because it can collaborate in the clarification of an objective that is fully common, since the risk that personalism prevails in the establishment of the common is latent, above all, in an era that is lax in terms of criteria, since in the era of mass media the slogan is: all opinions are valid in themselves.

The possibility of transforming the world is not negligible, but the transformation becomes an implosion, but is sustained in one sense, that is, what to think and what to do in the face of what is considered failed: "The crisis of the organization should not be sought in postmodern questioning, but in the promises that modernity itself did not fulfill" (Tool, 2020, p. 1). You can no longer act and improve the past, thought and action are important so you are able to give to the present. In this sense, if freedom and coexistence have been functionalist, we must try to think and act so that freedom and coexistence make a break with functionalism; but to give up on freedom and coexistence is to make an apology for emptiness.

If there is a principle of the school that cannot be abandoned, taking into consideration that it is necessary to resignify it, it is that of teaching for all (Ramírez, 2016). That is, the school has to give a desk and, above all, an ethical and intellectual training to each of the individuals who make up and give meaning to society and common projects; without this teaching for all resulting in uniformity, which is part of the reductionisms that have made modernity suspicious. Likewise, the end of the Subject of History is not the end, on the contrary, it is the starting point to concretize life in common, since it is no longer a question of the school giving priority to a dominant idea of man and society. In this sense, the school has to adapt to the new historical condition and think beyond the bourgeoisie or the proletariat:

Comenius' ideal was fulfilled, but only in part, schooling responded to the pedagogical project of modernity, its design and configuration expresses a desire for the order and systematization of educational processes to motivate progress, notions that are typical of the bourgeois mentality and its scientific story. (Lopez, 2016, p. 48)

Science is not under the magnifying glass, the accusations and suspicions are in relation to scientism, to the extent that it associates knowledge only with science (Carmona, 2007). This way of understanding situations and things is counterproductive, if what you want is to detonate the knowledge between the self and the other, so that you can forge a coexistence or life in common. In this sense, the school has to adapt to the circumstances and promote an education with practical knowledge (ethical and moral).

He has been assigned and continues to be assigned colossal tasks to the school, so prudence is necessary when making requests, if you do not want to repeat the mistakes of the past. On the other hand, the school can promote conversation as a habit beyond its classrooms: "What makes something a conversation is not the fact that we have been taught something new, but that we have found in the other something that we had not yet found in our experience of the world" (Carmona, 2007, p. 150). Listening to the other causes the self to leave its solipsism, and also makes respect, solidarity, feasible.

If man, in his individual and social dimension, can qualitatively modify culture and civilization, it is because he is willing to open himself to encounters and even disagreements, but if atomization and isolation are maintained as a slogan in this stage of modernity, because no more modifications are made to the school, nothing can be changed. However, we must try to dismantle and bury disenchantment, since man deserves a life in which his thoughts and actions mean the world, and will not lead to absurdity and emptiness.

**Conclusions:**

The outline of modernity and its impact on thought-action gives the possibility of asking whether the course of events can be changed? Where to sustain yourself, if in fact the efforts are wasted energy? It is difficult to destroy or renounce modernity, because despite the sorrows, it is the reference as to what is said and what is done. Thus, modernity remains the dominant narrative, in the sense that it is assumed as a guide or confronted, but it does not go unnoticed.

It is sensible to denounce and distance oneself from instrumental reason. However, abdicating reason is nonsense, in the sense of being left unprotected, because without judgments there is no longer meaning, not even for nonsense. In addition, if one aspires to modify the way in which to carry out coexistence, it is necessary to talk as reasonably as possible, so that objectives can be established that convene and challenge those who concur and are being in the socio-historical space.

If the explanations can no longer be total, in the sense that they designate a single way of understanding and experiencing the world; the possible solutions cannot be total either, suffice as an example, the reflection on the school. That is, if coexistence through the school has been thought of here, it is not because it is considered that only the school has the capacity to detonate it; but you cannot detract from the quality of teaching that the school has, above all, if you do not have a viable proposal to replace it. Now, school education is historical and adapts to the circumstances, that characteristic is what allows us to continue having confidence in the school, so that it contributes to the orientation of man in this stage of modernity.

If reductionisms are to be demolished, it is important that thought does not fall into them. In this sense, the school not only has to teach and detonate coexistence, because the school does not have to renounce the teaching and formation of the intellect. Now, the longing is for the school to form in an integral way, but not as a slogan to attract consumers, but to really try to contribute so that the learners are able to understand and generate knowledge, in addition, to be in a position to distinguish ethically and in the present the good from the evil.

How far is it appropriate to seek the distinction of good and evil? Can the eagerness to distinguish good from evil today be considered part of modern thought? Here the argument is taken up that the questions are not always correct, but they are not therefore fruitless, since they move the thought towards the exploration of veins that it had not considered before. In this sense, the distinction of good and evil can make it possible to clarify and express the meanings of a disenchanted era, but not alien to violence, which is counterproductive in order to seek to establish coexistence between the self and the other.

If it is considered that modernity has a critical and inventive spirit, the task for moderns today would be to resignify it, with this it also has to resignify its pedagogical institution, that is, the school. That is, so that the confidence in reason or in the ability to teach that the school has is not exhausted, both have to clarify the scenario and outline the course to follow individually and collectively. However, reason and school must cease to be comparsas of reductionisms: scientific, social, ethical.

Intervention for the sake of making the world genuinely shared for the self-other is what can bring about the end of disenchantment. But, that possibility that is glimpsed in the intervention through thought-action cannot remain only in longing. Likewise, it should be remembered that commitment and effort are not enough, although without them it becomes impossible to project sensibly with respect to another way of being in the world, with the understanding that we want to overcome the reductionisms and absurdities of modernity.

**References**

Bauman, Z. (2009). Postmodern ethics. Madrid, Spain. Siglo XXI Editores.

Benjamin, W. (2008). Thesis on history and other fragments. Federal District, Mexico: Itaca/UACM.

Carmona, M. (2007). Education and the crisis of modernity. Towards a humanizing education. *Journal of Arts and Humanities UNICA, 8*  (19), 134-157. Retrieved from <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1701/170118451008.pdf>

Echeverria, B. (2008). Introduction. Benjamin, the Jewish condition and politics. In: Thesis on history and other fragments. Federal District, Mexico: Itaca/UACM.

Gellner, E. (2001). Nations and nationalism. Madrid, Spain: Alianza Editorial.

Giddens, A. (1994). Consequences of modernity. Madrid, Spain: Alianza Editorial.

Tool. (2020). The crisis of the school: a reflection on the problem of its specificity. Retrieved from <https://herramienta.com.ar/articulo.php?id=874>

Horkheimer, M. (1973). Critique of instrumental reason. Buenos Aires, Argentina: SOUTH.

Levinas, E. (2008). Ethics and infinity. Madrid, Spain: Machado Ediciones.

Lopez, L. (2016). Schooling: Comenio's pedagogical project for modernity. *Journal of Education Sciences ACADEMICUS, 1*(8), 46-49. Retrieved from <http://www.ice.uabjo.mx/media/15/2017/05/Art8_5.pdf>

Löwy, M; and Sayre, R. (2008). Rebellion and melancholy. Romanticism against the tide of modernity. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Nueva Visión.

Mariano, M.; Conforti, M. A. and Casado, N. (2012). Residual modernity. On education, school and community. The representations of the "behind the tracks". *Questión, 1*(35), 358-371. Retrieved from <https://perio.unlp.edu.ar/ojs/index.php/question/article/view/1575/1374>

Noro, J. (2006). Schools are going through a crisis of meaning. Modern schooling must be abolished to create a new structure in keeping with the times. *Trends in Education, 21*. Retrieved from <https://www.tendencias21.net/Las-escuelas-atraviesan-una-crisis-de-sentido_a950.html>

Tello, C. (2010). The school in times of crisis of modernity. *Odysseus Electronic Journal of Pedagogy.* Retrieved from <https://odiseo.com.mx/marcatexto/la-escuela-en-tiempos-de-crisis-de-la-modernidad/>

Rancière, J. (2010). The emancipated spectator. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Manantial.

Rancière, J. (2017). Modern times. Essays on temporality in art and politics. Santander, Spain: Shangrila ediciones.

Rivas, R. (2013). Critical essays on postmodernity. Crisis of the meaning of life and history. Federal District, Mexico: Universidad Intercontinental.

Spinoza, B. (2011). Ethics demonstrated according to geometric order. Madrid, Spain: Gredos.

Torres, A. (1997). School and community. Modernity and new senses of the community. *Pedagogy and knowledge, 10,*5-14. Retrieved from <https://revistas.pedagogica.edu.co/index.php/PYS/article/view/6211/5163>

Touraine, A. (1994). Critique of modernity. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Vazquez, J. (2000). Education and modernity. Between the utopia and the bureaucracy of Eduardo Terrén. *Politics and Society,*35, 183-184. Retrieved from [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VETELMKVLp0J:ri.ibero.mx/handle/ibero/1365+&cd=2&hl=es-419&ct=clnk&gl=mx.](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VETELMKVLp0J:ri.ibero.mx/handle/ibero/1365+&cd=2&hl=es-419&ct=clnk&gl=mx)